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ABSTRACT—Over the past several years, several high-profile complaints
have been levied against Article III judges alleging improper conduct. Many
of these complaints, however, were dismissed without investigation after the
judge in question removed themselves from the jurisdiction of the circuit’s
judicial council—oftentimes through retirement and once through elevation
to the Supreme Court. When judges—the literal arbiters of justice within
American society—are able to elude oversight of their own potential
misconduct, it puts the legitimacy of the judiciary and the rule of law in
jeopardy.
This Essay argues that it is imperative that mechanisms are adopted that
will ensure investigations into judicial misconduct are completed, even in
the event that the individual is no longer serving as a judge in the circuit
where the complaint has been filed. This Essay suggests two reforms. First,
the adoption of customs that will refer any short-circuited investigation to
the state bar and to Congress for additional inquiry. Second, the expansion
of the judicial councils’ authority to investigate complaints so as to address
the jurisdictional limitations that currently allow judges to circumvent
attempts at judicial oversight over allegations of misconduct. The status quo
that incentivizes avoiding judicial discipline must be reformed into one that
allows for thorough and fair investigation of these important matters of
public concern.
AUTHOR—Professor of Law, Robert & Marion Short Scholar, Director of
Program on Ethics, Compliance & Inclusion, Notre Dame Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
One need not look further than the Bible to understand the longstanding
importance of selecting judges who are beyond reproach—who arguably
demonstrate the best of humankind and whose opinions will be viewed as
legitimate authority worthy of respect. In Exodus, after Moses led the
Israelites out of Egypt, his father-in-law, Jethro, comes for a visit. Jethro sees
the effort Moses is engaged in from morning until evening serving as the
lone judge for disputes that arose between and amongst the Israelites. Jethro
admonishes Moses to find others to serve as judges. In doing so, Jethro
encourages Moses to “select capable men from all the people—men who fear
God, trustworthy men who hate dishonest gain—and appoint them as
officials” to serve as judges for the people.1 While it would be inappropriate
to appoint only judges who fear God within the United States,2 the tenor of
Jethro’s admonition—that those elevated to the position of judge should be
trustworthy, ethical individuals who are considered to be virtuous—remains
important as society develops a set of expectations regarding appropriate
conduct for those tasked with the awesome responsibility of serving as a
judge.
The need for care when selecting judges is similarly evident within the
founding story of the United States. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander
Hamilton advocated the establishment of something that had been missing
in government under the Articles of Confederation: a “judiciary department.”
1
2
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He explained that “all the judges who may be appointed by the United States
are to hold their offices during good behaviour.” 3 Although “good
behaviour” is conventionally understood4 as a term of art that secures the
judge’s tenure in office, Hamilton connected it to the ethical quality of the
judiciary:
The standard of good behaviour for the continuance in office of the judicial
magistracy is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements
in the practice of government. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the
despotism of the prince: In a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the
encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best
expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright
and impartial administration of the laws. 5

A strong judiciary was essential to the democratic experiment the Founders
were about to undertake. And as true then as it is today, democracies are
bound to crumble absent a strong commitment to the rule of law by both civil
society and organized government.
“Rule of law is a principle under which all persons, institutions, and
entities are accountable to laws that are: [p]ublicly promulgated[,] [e]qually
enforced[,] [i]ndependently adjudicated[,] [a]nd consistent with international
human rights principles.”6 Accordingly, judges are essential to the belief in
and adherence to this principle and play an integral role in the democratic
ideals of freedom and justice. Indeed, the rule of law depends on an
independent judiciary committed to objectively administering justice, but
also a populace that respects those who have been given responsibility to
oversee the adjudication of the claims, controversies, and disputes that
naturally arise amongst and involving citizens and their government.
Much has changed since the time of both Moses and Hamilton, but the
importance of selecting judges who are beyond reproach—who are the best
of us—has endured. And most of the time, it seems to work.7 For Article III

3 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 521–22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis
omitted).
4 Professors Saikrishna Prakash and Steven D. Smith have provided a historical account explaining
that the term “good behavior” is rooted in concerns about the behavior of the judge and not limited as a
proxy to mean “life tenure.” Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge,
116 YALE L.J. 72, 88–105 (2006).
5
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 3, at 522.
6 Overview—Rule of Law, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educationalactivities/overview-rule-law [https://perma.cc/R9ZK-8G44].
7 It has not, however, traditionally worked to ensure that the judiciary is made up of a
demographically diverse set of individuals who mirror the demographics of the communities in which
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judges, the President, often in consultation with members of the Senate,
nominates an individual to be appointed to a judgeship, the U.S. Senate
conducts a confirmation hearing, the American Bar Association and others
often provide information and guidance regarding the candidate’s
qualifications, and the individual is confirmed. 8 Even in the world of
increased political polarization, 9 the general idea that the judiciary is an
independent and essential component of democracy remains. The judicial
enterprise relies upon its legitimacy, and its legitimacy turns on the character
of its judges. Thus, the judicial enterprise rises and falls with the character
of its judges.
Because of the important role judges play within the key functions of
American society, safeguards have been put in place to ensure that concerns
regarding allegations of judicial misconduct are addressed. This Essay
focuses on one such safeguard, the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (Judicial Conduct and Disability Act),
which governs concerns regarding the conduct or disability of federal
judges.10 The Act has enabled the judiciary—through its own self-oversight
and governance—to address allegations of improper conduct or disability of
judges as they arise. On the one hand, there are judges who have engaged in
irregular conduct and are subsequently found to be suffering from a physical
or mental illness. In these instances, the Act allows for a dignified and often
private resolution to the matter by the chief judge of the circuit seeking
retirement of the judge, often on the basis of disability.11 On the other hand,
there have been judges who have engaged in outrageous, improper behavior
who have been publicly reprimanded and disciplined by their colleagues via
the circuit’s judicial council.12
they serve. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public
Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 434–36 (2000).
8 Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III
Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 971–72, 1030–32 (2007).
9 Richard L. Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 264–65 (2019). The
beginnings of modern-day political polarization surrounding the judiciary often point to Robert Bork’s
nomination to the Supreme Court, but studies have demonstrated that the “current period of politicization
originated in the 1960s.” Id. at 264.
10 Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64.
11 This practice was confirmed in background comments provided to the author by a federal judge.
12 For example, the actions taken against then-Judge Samuel B. Kent exemplify the power of a
judicial council to investigate claims of misconduct and to levy discipline in response. Lise Olsen &
Harvey Rice, Judge Disciplined for Sexual Harassment, HOUS. CHRON. (Sept. 28, 2007, 5:30 AM),
https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Judge-disciplined-for-sexual-harassment1672514.php [https://perma.cc/34X9-ZUQM]; Lise Olsen, Details Emerge in Judge Kent Scandal, HOUS.
CHRON. (Nov. 11, 2007, 6:30 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Details-emergein-Judge-Kent-scandal-1794470.php [https://perma.cc/9Q5K-FMUN]. Judge Kent was eventually
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This Essay focuses on a narrow question under the Act, which falls
somewhere in between the two situations above. What happens, or perhaps
what should happen, when allegations of improper conduct are levied against
a judge, but the judge leaves the court prior to a full inquiry? Currently, under
the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, formal complaints regarding the
conduct of Article III judges are referred to the chief judge of the circuit court
where the judge holds office.13 In a typical matter, the chief judge of the
circuit opens an inquiry, investigates the merits of the complaint, and the
chief judge or the judicial council concludes with a decision.14
The Act’s mandate, however, applies only to current judges, which has
resulted in some judges stepping down from the bench after a complaint is
levied against them. As the Second Circuit Judicial Council explained:
The Act is concerned with individuals who currently exercise the powers of the
office of federal judge. Its emphasis is on correction of conditions that interfere
with the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts. . . . Because the now former judge fully resigned the office of United
States circuit judge, and can no longer perform any judicial duties, the former
judge does not fall within the scope of persons who can be investigated under
the Act.15

In recent years, several investigations into the conduct of Article III judges
have been cut short when the judges left the court before the judicial council
concluded its work.16 This limitation of the Act is problematic for a variety
of reasons, in part because it allows judges—the literal arbiters of justice
within American society—to avoid judgment.

convicted and sentenced to prison for lying during the judicial council investigation. James C. McKinley
Jr., Judge Sentenced to Prison for Lying About Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/us/12judge.html [https://perma.cc/6BEX-YRXW].
13 28 U.S.C. § 351(c).
14 Id. §§ 352(a)–(b), 354.
15 Order at 2, In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, Nos. 18-90204-jm, 18-90205-jm, 18-90206jm, 18-90210-jm (2d Cir. Jud. Council Apr. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Barry Order].
16 See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 17-90118-jm, slip op. at 2 (2d Cir. Jud.
Council Feb. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Kozinski Order] (citing 28 U.S.C. § 351(d)(1)) (reasoning that Alex
Kozinski no longer fit the definition of “judge” after retiring). “Accordingly, the Judicial Council must
‘conclude the proceeding because [of] . . . intervening events . . . .’” Id. at 2–3 (quoting 2E U.S. CTS.,
GUIDE TO JUDICIAL POLICY, ch. 3, Rule 20(b)(1)(B) (2019) [hereinafter JCDA RULES]); see also In re
Complaints Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, Nos. 10-18-90038 through 10-18-90067, 1018-90069 through 10-18-90107, 10-18-90109 through 10-18-90122, slip op. at 2, 6–7, (10th Cir. Jud.
Council Dec. 18, 2018) [hereinafter Kavanaugh Order] (citing 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(i)) (dismissing
judicial-conduct complaints against then-Judge Kavanaugh because a circuit court judge is no longer
covered by the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act after being elevated to the Supreme Court).
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This Essay focuses on Article III judges who have, allegedly, behaved
badly, yet avoided judicial discipline by resigning17 from the bench.18 Part I
frames the basic issue and problem by outlining the oversight regimes for
Article III judges. It then discusses some recent examples of judges avoiding
judicial discipline.
Part II articulates the Essay’s thesis: an argument in favor of
mechanisms that will ensure investigations into judicial misconduct are
completed, even in the event that the individual is no longer serving as a
judge or serving as a judge subject to the Act’s mandate. It relies upon
literature exploring legitimacy and the courts to explain why a lack of robust
oversight of and investigation into complaints regarding members of the
judiciary may delegitimize rule-of-law norms that are necessary to the proper
functioning of the United States’ democracy. Part II then turns to two
proposals: (i) create a custom of automatic referrals regarding the need for
an investigation into a judge’s conduct from the judicial council to the state
bars for which the judge is a member and to Congress, or (ii) amend the Act
so that investigations can continue even if the judge is no longer on the court.
Part III takes into account some additional considerations raised by the
Essay’s argument, including (i) the impact of unsanctioned misconduct on
the judiciary’s members, (ii) what to do regarding the pension of a judge who
has retired to avoid investigations of misconduct, and (iii) how best to
address the expectations and conduct of Supreme Court Justices.
I.

AVOIDING JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

Currently, there are two ways in which Article III judges may be subject
to discipline. The first is via congressional impeachment and removal from
office. The second is under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act. Under
both avenues, the general result has been that inquiries into alleged judicial
misconduct are terminated without pursuing the merits of the underlying
complaint when judges step down from the bench. Indeed, while Congress
may have the authority to continue to pursue the inquiry through its
impeachment power, it has historically chosen not to do so. Over the past
several years, the short-circuiting of investigations into judicial impropriety
has played out in the public eye. The full ramifications of these closed
17

Resigning from the bench could mean leaving the bench altogether, but it might also include
leaving the bench in the circuit where a complaint has been filed under the Act and moving to another
court (e.g., the Supreme Court). See Kavanaugh Order, supra note 16, at 6–7.
18 The Act also applies to non-Article III federal judges, but because those judges are not subject to
lifetime appointments, do not receive lifetime compensation, and are more easily removed from office,
concerns regarding their potential misconduct are more easily remedied than misconduct of Article III
judges. This Essay is agnostic on whether it makes sense to apply this Essay’s proposals to non-Article
III judges.
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investigations are unknown. Nevertheless, there are many reasons to theorize
that this approach both damages rule-of-law norms generally and, more
specifically, public trust in the role of judges and the judiciary.
A. Oversight for Article III Judges
As required by the U.S. Constitution, Article III judges, who are
nominated by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, “hold their
office during good behavior,” which has traditionally been interpreted as
functioning as a lifetime appointment. 19 When a question arises as to a
judge’s good behavior, there are two potential avenues that can be pursued.
First, congressional impeachment as outlined in the U.S. Constitution.
Second, the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, which governs the formal
complaint and discipline procedures for judges accused of misconduct.
1. Impeachment
The U.S. Constitution grants Article III judges the ability to “hold their
offices during good behaviour.”20 This text is understood as giving judges
lifetime tenure, subject to limited circumstances that justify removal.21 To
date, the U.S. House of Representatives has only impeached fifteen judges;
of that number, only eight have been convicted by the U.S. Senate. 22
Congress has previously found the following professional, as well as
personal, conduct and behavior impeachable as high crimes and
misdemeanors: intoxication,23 arbitrary and oppressive trial conduct,24 abuse

19
About
Federal
Judges,
U.S. CTS. (internal
quotation
marks
omitted),
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/about-federal-judges [https://perma.cc/CYD3-4P74].
20 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
21 See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955) (noting Article III courts “are
presided over by judges appointed for life, subject only to removal by impeachment”); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 79, at 473 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that Article III judges, “if they
behave properly, will be secured in [their office] for life”).
22
Impeachments of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/node/7496
[https://perma.cc/L66A-KV2G]; Judges and Judicial Administration—Journalist’s Guide, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judges-and-judicial-administration-journalists-guide#:~:
text=Only%20Congress%20has%20the%20authority,only%20eight%20have%20been%20convicted
[https://perma.cc/7HL6-JZJH].
23 U.S. District Court Judge John Pickering for the District of New Hampshire was impeached on
March 3, 1803 on charges of mental instability and intoxication on the bench; he was convicted and
removed from office by the Senate on March 12, 1804. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 333, 353, 367 (1804).
24 U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Samuel Chase was impeached on March 12, 1804 on
charges of arbitrary and oppressive conduct of trials. The Senate acquitted him on March 1, 1805.
14 ANNALS OF CONG. 664–65, 669 (1805).
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of the contempt power, 25 improper relations with litigants, 26 income tax
evasion resulting in a criminal conviction,27 perjury,28 and sexual assault.29
Article III judges convicted by the Senate face various consequences.
First, and most notably, the judge or Justice will be removed from their
office. Second, the conviction will result in a loss of salary, future pensions,
and other benefits.30 A Senate conviction may also prevent the judge from
holding a similar office in the future.31 Whether the House may impeach, and
whether the Senate may convict, an Article III judge who has retired before
each body has concluded its proceedings are viewed as constitutional
questions that only each chamber can answer. 32 As a practical matter,
Congress will generally end—or in the alternative, will not initiate—
impeachment proceedings when an Article III judge retires or resigns since
the primary objective, in the eyes of many, of removing her from office has
already been accomplished, albeit through voluntary means.
25

U.S. District Court Judge Charles Swayne for the Northern District of Florida was impeached on
charges of abuse of contempt on December 13, 1904. He was acquitted on February 27, 1905. 39 CONG.
REC. 214, 248 (1904); 39 CONG. REC. 1281, 1283, 3471–72 (1905).
26 Third Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Robert W. Archibald was impeached on July 11, 1912 on
charges of improper business relationships with litigants. On January 13, 1913, he was convicted and
removed from office by the Senate. 48 CONG. REC. 8904, 8934 (1912); 49 CONG. REC. 1438, 1448 (1913).
27 Judge Harry E. Claiborne for the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada was impeached on
July 22, 1986 on charges of income tax evasion and of remaining on the bench following a criminal
conviction. He was convicted and removed from office by the Senate on October 9, 1986. 132 CONG.
REC. 17,295, 17,305–06, 29,870–71 (1986).
28
Judge Alcee L. Hastings for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida was
impeached on August 3, 1988 on charges of perjury and conspiring to solicit a bribe, and was convicted
and removed from office by the Senate on October 20, 1989. 134 CONG. REC. 20,208, 20,221–22 (1988);
135 CONG. REC. 25,329–30, 25,335 (1989).
29 Samuel B. Kent, then-Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, was
impeached on June 19, 2009 on charges of sexual assault, obstructing and impeding an official
proceeding, and making false and misleading statements. 155 CONG. REC. 15,748, 15,759–61 (2009).
However, he resigned from office on June 30, 2009. Id. at 16,226–27. The U.S. House of Representatives
then passed a resolution on July 20, 2009 to no longer pursue the articles of impeachment. Id. at 18,331.
The Senate dismissed the impeachment articles on July 22, 2009. Id. at 18,696–97.
30 Alexa J. Smith, Note, Federal Judicial Impeachment: Defining Process Due, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
639, 657 n.121 (1995) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 399 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)); see also David G. Savage, Impeachment Hearings End for Federal Judge, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
21, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-sep-21-la-na-judge-impeach20100921-story.html [https://perma.cc/8434-R7ZG] (noting that the Senate conviction of Judge G.
Thomas Porteous Jr. would result in a loss of a $174,000 yearly salary and future pension).
31 Not all impeachment convictions prevent judges from holding office again. See Waggoner v.
Hastings, 816 F. Supp. 716, 719–20 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (stating that removing a judge from office and
banning her from holding future office are discrete questions that must be decided during impeachment
proceedings).
32 See 77 CONG. REC. 4058 (1933) (moving a resolution to the House floor for a vote regarding the
question of whether a person who is no longer serving as a civil officer can be impeached).
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2. The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
As is relevant to this Essay, the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act lays
out the process for reviewing whether a judge’s conduct 33 has been
“prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business
of the courts.”34 Under the Act, the chief judge of the circuit where the judge
at issue holds office has an extraordinary amount of power which allows her
to initiate an investigation on her own, to initiate an investigation in response
to a complaint, or to dismiss a complaint she receives.35 When an individual
is seeking review under the Act, she must first submit a brief statement
regarding the misconduct with the clerk for the circuit court where the
accused judge holds office.36 Once submitted, the chief judge of the circuit
will review the complaint to determine what, if any, action should be taken
based on the allegations.37 The chief judge may dismiss the complaint (i) for
a lack of—or plainly untrue—submitted information by the complainant,
(ii) for an inability to investigate, or (iii) if corrective actions have already
been taken, and thus a formal investigation no longer seems required. The
chief judge may also dismiss the complaint if there has been an “intervening
event[].”38 Previous intervening acts have included, inter alia, self-imposed
retirement of the judge under investigation or an appointment to the U.S.
Supreme Court.39 As one judicial council noted, “When the subject of the

33 Cognizable misconduct under the Act includes, but is not limited to, violations of specific
standards of judicial conduct (bribes, improper ex parte communications, partisan statements, income
violations, granting preferential treatment to litigants, etc.) and abusive and harassing behavior (hostile
work environment, discrimination, retaliation, sexual harassment or assault or other unwanted or
unsolicited sexual contact, etc.). JCDA RULES, supra note 16, at Rule 4(a). Conduct not covered by the
Act includes (1) allegations that “call[] into question the correctness of a judge’s ruling,” or (2) allegations
about delay in rulings or decisions. Id. at Rule 4(b).
34 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). While these judges were subject to criminal prosecutions prior to the Act,
virtually “no sitting federal judge was ever prosecuted and convicted of a crime committeed [sic] while
in office” in “two hundred years of judicial history prior to 1980.” NAT’L COMM’N ON JUD. DISCIPLINE
& REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 72 (1993).
35 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1). But note, the chief judge has a significant amount of power and autonomy
in her review of the allegations. JCDA RULES, supra note 16, at Rule 3(c)(2) (noting that a complaint
may be “information from any source, other than a document [filed by or for a person] that gives a chief
judge probable cause to believe that a covered judge . . . has engaged in misconduct . . . whether or not
the information is framed as or is intended to be an allegation of misconduct” (emphasis added)); see also
Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 244, 247–59
(1993) (noting that some have argued that “judges cannot be trusted to judge judges”).
36
28 U.S.C. § 351(a).
37 Id. § 352(a).
38 Id. § 352(b).
39 Kozinski Order, supra note 16, at 1, 3 (noting the resignation of former Ninth Circuit Judge Alex
Kozinski); Barry Order, supra note 15, at 2 (noting the resignation of former Third Circuit Judge
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complaint is no longer a judicial officer, he is beyond the reach of these
procedures and the remedies [the Act] prescribe[s].”40
If the chief judge finds moving forward with the investigation is
appropriate, she will then appoint herself, along with other judges, to a
“special committee” to further investigate the complaint’s allegations.41 In
some instances, the complaint is transferred to another circuit’s judicial
council to ensure that the investigation looks, and is, objective. 42 A
complainant or the accused judge “may petition the judicial council” to
review the decision if either is aggrieved with the chief judge’s decision to
dismiss or proceed with an investigation.43
Once formed, the special committee conducts an “investigation as
extensive as it considers necessary.” 44 All documents, testimony, and
evidence are made available to the accused judge. The judge is allowed to
cross-examine witnesses and may submit arguments, orally or by writing, to
the committee.45 When the investigation is completed, the special committee
submits its report to the circuit court judicial council that then decides
whether to (i) conduct any additional investigation, (ii) dismiss the
complaint, or (iii) take appropriate action “to assure the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts within the circuit.”46
Discipline by the judicial council may include: (i) “requesting the judge
to retire voluntarily,”47 (ii) “censuring or reprimanding [the] judge by means
of public announcement” or private communication, or (iii) temporarily
ordering that the judge no longer be assigned cases.48 The Act, however, does
place certain limitations on the judicial council’s ability to discipline.
Specifically, “[u]nder no circumstances may the judicial council order
removal from office of any [Article III] judge appointed to hold office during
good behavior.”49

Maryanne Trump Barry); Kavanaugh Order, supra note 16, at 2 (noting the elevation of Justice Brett M.
Kavanaugh).
40 In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 782 F.2d 181, 181 (9th Cir. 1986).
41 28 U.S.C. § 353(a)(1).
42 JCDA RULES, supra note 16, at Rule 26.
43 28 U.S.C. § 352(c).
44 Id. § 353(c).
45 Id. § 358(b)(2).
46
Id. §§ 353(c), 354(a)(1).
47 Under Rule 20, even if the Judicial Council orders a retirement, it may waive the ordinary lengthof-service requirements. See JCDA RULES, supra note 16, at Rule 20(b)(1)(D)(v).
48 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2)(A)–(B).
49 Id. § 354(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
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Importantly, those facing misconduct inquiries can terminate the
investigation, and place themselves outside of the Act’s jurisdiction, 50 by
triggering an “intervening event[]”—for example, by voluntarily retiring
before the investigation’s conclusion or being appointed to the U.S. Supreme
Court.51
B. Short-Circuited Investigations
Judicial misconduct investigations sometimes result in discipline,52 but
this Essay focuses on allegations that are made against Article III judges
where an inquiry under the Act is commenced but cut short when the judge
leaves the court, whether by retirement or some other reason. This Section
reviews three investigations into Article III circuit court judges that have
been initiated under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act in the past few
years. While the resolution of the complaints levied against each judge were
similar—having been concluded without a determination on the merits—the
judges’ lives after leaving the circuit courts look quite different.
1. Judge Maryanne Trump Barry
President Reagan appointed Maryanne Trump Barry to the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey in 1983. She was then elevated to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit by President Clinton in 1999.53
Judge Barry went on senior inactive status in February 2017, weeks after her
brother, Donald Trump, began his presidency.54 On October 2, 2018, the New
York Times published an article alleging that Donald Trump and his
siblings—including Judge Barry—created numerous shell companies to pay
lower taxes on the money they received from their father, Fred Trump. 55
50

See Kozinski Order, supra note 16, at 3–4 (noting that the resignation of former Ninth Circuit
Judge Alex Kozinski was an intervening event that ended the investigation); Barry Order, supra note 15,
at 2 (noting that the resignation of Third Circuit Judge Maryanne Trump Barry was an intervening event
that ended the investigation).
51 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(2); JCDA RULES, supra note 16, at 27.
52 See, e.g., Mihir Zaveri, Federal Judge in Kansas Resigns After Reprimand for Sexual Harassment,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/us/judge-carlos-murguia-sexualharassment.html [https://perma.cc/C656-53CA]; Bill Mears, Judge Kozinksi Admonished for Explicit
Items on Web Site, CNN (July 2, 2009), https://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/07/02/judge.explicit.files/
[https://perma.cc/ZA4E-HN39].
53 Barry, Maryanne Trump, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/barry-maryannetrump [https://perma.cc/9WAJ-PR3U].
54
Russ Buettner & Susanne Craig, Retiring as a Judge, Trump’s Sister Ends Court Inquiry into Her
Role in Tax Dodges, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/us/maryannetrump-barry-misconduct-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/8QCT-UGT5].
55 David Barstow, Susanne Craig & Russ Buettner, Trump Engaged in Suspect Tax Schemes as He
Reaped Riches from His Father, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
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Based on the allegations in the New York Times story, Judge Barry would
have received a “windfall” of over $180 million from the sale of her
properties.56
The New York Times article prompted the filing of four judicial
misconduct complaints against Judge Barry that were then transferred to the
Second Circuit Judicial Council. However, on February 11, 2019, shortly
after Judge Barry was officially notified of the investigation, she submitted
her retirement papers.57 Once her retirement went into effect, the Judicial
Council issued an order, stating that it was ending the investigative
proceedings against her given its lack of jurisdiction.58 She does not appear
to have pursued any professional opportunities since retiring.
2. Judge Alexander Kozinski (2017 Allegations)
Judge Alexander Kozinski started his federal judicial career as a U.S.
Court of Federal Claims judge in 1982.59 After Judge Kozinski resigned from
the court in 1985, President Reagan nominated—and the Senate later
confirmed—him to fill a new seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.60
On December 8, 2017, the Washington Post published accusations from
two former law clerks that Judge Kozinski engaged in sexual misconduct.61
On December 14, 2017, the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit issued an
order disclosing that a complaint was filed against Judge Kozinski based on
the Washington Post’s reporting, and that it was transferring the case to
another circuit for review.62 On December 15, 2017, nine more women came
forward accusing Judge Kozinski of sexual misconduct that included claims
interactive/2018/10/02/us/politics/donald-trump-tax-schemes-fred-trump.html [https://perma.cc/36HM2VKQ].
56 Buettner & Craig, supra note 54.
57 Id.
58 Barry Order, supra note 15, at 2.
59
Kozinski, Alex, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/kozinski-alex
[https://perma.cc/CFB5-JWX6].
60 Id.
61 Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused of Sexual Misconduct,
WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/prominentappeals-court-judge-alex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/08/1763e2b8-d913-11e7a841-2066faf731ef_story.html [https://perma.cc/HK3J-NJWW]. Two former clerks identified
themselves for the article while four others remained anonymous out of fear of reprisal. Id.
62 In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 17-90118, slip op. at 1–2 (9th Cir. Jud. Council Dec.
14, 2017), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/ce9/2017/12/14/17-90118order.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YV8H-GULA]; Maura Dolan, Judges to Investigate Alex Kozinski as More Women Allege Sexual
Misconduct, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2017, 6:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lnkozinski-misconduct-probe-20171215-story.html [https://perma.cc/SMZ6-DVYN].
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of unwanted touching and kissing.63 On December 18, 2017, Judge Kozinski
issued a statement explaining that he was retiring effective immediately.64
He noted that it “grieve[d]” him to know that his “broad sense of humor
and . . . candid way of speaking” caused his “clerks to feel uncomfortable”
and that it was never his intent to do so.65
In its February 2018 opinion, the Second Circuit Judicial Council
acknowledged the effect that his resignation had on their investigation,
noting that it “preclud[ed] any inquiry by the Judicial Council” because he
was now “outside the parameters of the Act.” 66 Accordingly, the Judicial
Council was forced to end its investigation.67 However, given the gravity of
the accusations, the Council requested that the Committee on Judicial
Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference forward the opinion to
appropriate congressional committees.68
One year after opting into retirement, Judge Kozinski reentered the
private sector serving as counsel in a copyright case before the court he once
presided over.69 He has also attended events within the legal community70

63 Avery Anapol, Nine More Women Accuse Prominent Appeals Court Judge of Sexual Misconduct,
HILL (Dec. 15, 2017, 9:03 PM), https://thehill.com/legal/365209-nine-more-women-accuse-prominentappeals-court-judge-of-sexual-misconduct [https://perma.cc/SBP9-SXXW].
64 Statement of Judge Alex Kozinski (Dec. 18, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/
4332061/Alex-Kozinski-s-full-statement-announcing-his.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS45-FBR9].
65
Id.
66 Kozinski Order, supra note 16, at 3–4.
67 Id. (citing JCDA RULES, supra note 16, at Rule 20(b)(1)(B)).
68 Kozinski Order, supra note 16, at 4. It should be acknowledged, however, that after the allegations
about Judge Kozinski and other members of the judiciary regarding sexual impropriety, a number of
actions were taken by the federal judiciary. The full breadth of the judiciary’s response is beyond the
scope of this Essay, but both nationally and within the Ninth Circuit new policies and procedures have
been implemented to allow for safer and clearer protocols for reporting allegations of sexual harassment
and misconduct. See, e.g., Workplace Conduct in the Federal Judiciary, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/workplace-conduct-federal-judiciary [https://perma.cc/
439M-SWVQ]; NINTH CIR. JUD. COUNCIL, NINTH CIRCUIT EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY
AND COMMITMENT TO A FAIR AND RESPECTFUL WORKPLACE 3 (2019), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/
datastore/general/2019/06/18/NinthCircuitEDRPolicyApproved-12272018.pdf [https://perma.cc/FFV2KS5F].
69 Debra Cassens Weiss, Afternoon Briefs: Alex Kozinski Returns as Litigator; Judge Blocks Firm’s
Defamation
Suit
Against
Ex-Partner,
ABA
J.
(Dec.
6,
2019,
4:20
PM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/afternoon-briefs-alex-kozinski-returns-as-litigator-judgeblocks-firms-defamation-suit [https://perma.cc/89S2-7RPY].
70 See Kathryn Rubino, The Biglaw Firm Taking Disgraced Former Judge Kozinski to Dinner,
ABOVE THE L. (Nov. 18, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/11/the-biglaw-firm-takingdisgraced-former-judge-kozinski-to-dinner/ [https://perma.cc/9BPN-J6W4] (noting that Judge Kozinski
attended an Association of Business Trial Lawyers event as the featured guest of Jenner & Block LLP).
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and has participated in public speaking engagements.71 He remains an active,
practicing member of the California Bar and is listed as working at the “Law
Office of Alex Kozinski.”72
3. Then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh
Justice Brett Kavanaugh became an Article III judge in 2006 after
President George W. Bush nominated him to serve on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.73 In 2018, President Donald Trump nominated
then-Judge Kavanaugh to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court. 74 During his
Supreme Court nomination hearings, he was publicly accused of sexually
assaulting a woman while in high school.75 The Senate confirmed Justice
Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court on October 6, 2018 by a 50–48 vote.76
The allegation and his testimony during the nomination process
prompted a total of eighty-three judicial complaints filed against him. Chief
Justice John Roberts then referred the allegations to the Tenth Circuit for
review.77 The complaints included allegations that:

71 See Ryan Torok, Dershowitz and Shrum Debate Impeachment, #MeToo and BDS, JEWISH J. (Feb.
19, 2020), https://jewishjournal.com/community/310887/dershowitz-and-shrum-debate-impeachmentmetoo-and-bds/ [https://perma.cc/D3JD-XPMT] (stating that Judge Kozinski moderated the discussion).
72 Attorney Licensee Profile: Alex Kozinski #66473, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.
ca.gov/fal/Licensee/Detail/66473 [https://perma.cc/DZ9A-92XW]. An individual who filed an earlier
misconduct complaint against Judge Kozinski has since filed suit against him, alleging Judge Kozinski
lied to the Third Circuit Judicial Council during investigative proceedings. The case is still ongoing.
Complaint, Sanai v. Kozinski, No. 19-cv-08162-JCS (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2019), ECF No. 1.
73 Kavanaugh, Brett M., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/kavanaugh-brett-m
[https://perma.cc/MD7G-3XFG].
74 Remarks by President Trump Announcing Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh as the Nominee for Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 9, 2018, 9:03 PM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-announcing-judge-brett-mkavanaugh-nominee-associate-justice-supreme-court-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/T7WG-TE7F].
75 Emma Brown, California Professor, Writer of Confidential Brett Kavanaugh Letter, Speaks Out
About Her Allegation of Sexual Assault, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2018, 9:28 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/investigations/california-professor-writer-of-confidential-brett-kavanaugh-letterspeaks-out-about-her-allegation-of-sexual-assault/2018/09/16/46982194-b846-11e8-94eb-3bd52dfe917
b_story.html [https://perma.cc/F293-Y9AX].
76 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn In After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-supremecourt.html [https://perma.cc/QG2G-QLDV].
77 Samuel Chamberlain & Bill Mears, Roberts Refers Ethics Complaints Against Kavanaugh to
Federal Judges, FOX NEWS (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/roberts-refers-ethicscomplaints-against-kavanaugh-to-federal-judges [https://perma.cc/57NT-Q46N]; Tenth Circuit Judicial
Council Issues Order on Complaints Against Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh, 10TH CIR. CT. OF APPEALS,
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/ce/misconduct/kavanaugh-complaints [https://perma.cc/DR57-Q3SG].
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Justice Kavanaugh made false statements related to his
underlying conduct that formed the basis of these accusations
during his confirmation hearings in 2004, 2006, and 2018;
Justice Kavanaugh made inappropriate partisan statements that
demonstrated bias and lack of judicial temperament; and
Justice Kavanaugh treated members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee with disrespect.78

The Judicial Council noted, however, that under the Judicial Conduct
and Disability Act, covered judges include “circuit judge[s], district judge[s],
bankruptcy judge[s], [and] magistrate judge[s].” 79 Because Justice
Kavanaugh was no longer subject to the Act, the Judicial Council no longer
had jurisdiction and thus concluded its proceedings against him, but it did
acknowledge that the “allegations contained in the complaints are serious.”80
He has since been serving on the Supreme Court and has largely maintained
a posture outside the public eye.81
II. THE PATH FORWARD
The short-circuited investigations of the past few years demonstrate the
challenges and shortcomings in the existing procedures for handling alleged
judicial misconduct of Article III judges. This Essay argues it is imperative
that mechanisms are adopted that will ensure investigations into judicial
misconduct are completed, even in the event that the individual has, for
example, retired from the bench or been elevated to the Supreme Court. To
do otherwise has serious implications for rule-of-law norms in this country.
As scholars have demonstrated, when people perceive decision-makers, like
judges, as legitimate, it impacts their level of compliance with those
decision-makers’ pronouncements and orders. 82 But who will obey a
judiciary that fails to police itself?
78

Kavanaugh Order, supra note 16, at 3–4.
Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis removed) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 351(d)(1)).
80 Kavanaugh Order, supra note 16, at 8–9; Nina Totenberg, Federal Panel of Judges Dismisses All
83 Ethics Complaints Against Brett Kavanaugh, NPR (Dec. 18, 2018, 6:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2018/12/18/678004085/federal-panel-of-judges-dismiss-all-83-ethics-complaints-against-brettkavanaugh [https://perma.cc/2NA4-6DH3].
81 It appears he has engaged in just one public appearance since joining the Supreme Court. Ariane
de Vogue, Kavanaugh Expresses “Gratitude” to Conservative Gala for Support Through Controversial
Confirmation Process, CNN (Nov. 14, 2019, 11:45 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/14/politics/brettkavanaugh-washington-federalist-society-speech/index.html [https://perma.cc/8ZCZ-AKZK].
82 James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and
Political Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 487 (1989) (citing Kenneth Rasinski, Tom R. Tyler &
79
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This Part begins by considering how the cessation of an investigation
into a judge’s alleged misconduct might impact the populace’s view of courts
and judges as legitimate sources of authority, and the ways in which concerns
regarding civility may have contributed to the status quo. This Part next
outlines steps that could be taken by various members of the legal profession
and policymakers in an attempt to address the jurisdictional limitations
within the Act that permit Article III judges to retire or leave the circuit prior
to the conclusion of a full and complete investigation into complaints of
alleged misconduct. The proposal starts with the most feasible and easy-toimplement suggestion and ends with one that would require action on the
part of Congress—a rarity given today’s political realities. There are other
avenues, of course, that could be pursued to improve the quality and
robustness of investigations into potential judicial misconduct. However,
this Essay’s priority is to communicate the importance of adopting
mechanisms that will ensure investigations into judicial misconduct are fully
and fairly completed and not short-circuited by jurisdictional limitations
within the legal rules and procedures that govern judicial conduct.
A. Legitimacy and Civility
Despite allegations that they acted improperly, the aforementioned
federal judges have been able to continue their careers or transition to
retirement without undergoing thorough investigations into their actions.
The limitations imposed by the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
restricting judicial councils from investigating those judges who have
retired, plus Congress’s traditional reluctance to use its impeachment power
to discipline rogue judges, have resulted in a system where judges are able
to act without fear of meaningful oversight or sanction much of the time. In
short, it is often the case that the only discipline judges face is the stain on
their reputation when they resign in the midst of a pending investigation.83
Kim Fridkin, Exploring the Function of Legitimacy: Mediating Effects of Personal and Institutional
Legitimacy on Leadership Endorsement and System Support, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 386
(1985)).
83 While some members of Congress have put forth proposals, no bills have been passed, leaving the
Act’s limitations in place. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Senate Democrats
Back Strong Ethics Guidance for Judges (May 12, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/
release/senate-democrats-back-stronger-ethics-guidance-for-judges
[https://perma.cc/U9FR-42F8]
(supporting a rule banning judicial membership in advocacy organizations that potentially implicate
judicial impartiality and legitimacy); Zack Budryk, Warren Judicial Ethics Plan Would Allow New
Investigations into Kavanaugh, HILL (Oct. 7, 2019, 4:10 PM) https://thehill.com/homenews/
campaign/464721-warren-judicial-ethics-plan-would-extend-code-of-conduct-to-supreme-court [https://
perma.cc/KJR8-2VRZ] (describing U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren’s plan to allow investigations of
misconduct to continue after judges leave the bench).

968

115:953 (2020)

Avoiding Judicial Discipline

The current inability to fully investigate and sanction potential judicial
misconduct raises a whole host of questions, 84 but perhaps the most
important one is whether a failure to investigate claims of misconduct by a
judge harms people’s acceptance of the rule of law and the role of judiciary
within in it. It is important to note that judges are not magicians or allpowerful. The legitimacy of judicial decision-making comes from the
populace’s decision to accept judicial pronouncements and to act
accordingly.85
When a complainant and the public are aware of general information
about potential judicial misconduct and an investigation into the alleged
misconduct is initiated but then closed without a decision on the merits, it
may create the perception that judges are above the law. 86 It may send a
signal that everyday people will be required to undergo the indignities of
having their actions interrogated and investigated, but the very individuals
charged with overseeing those sorts of examinations can avoid similar
intrusions into their own conduct. If the public begins to believe that judges
are above the law in terms of their own personal conduct, it could have
dramatic ramifications for the legitimacy of the judicial system and the
respect for the rule of law, which tie together the very fabric of American
society.87
In some ways, the above observations regarding the need of the public
to view judges and the court as legitimate sources of authority are
unremarkable. Thus, one might question why judges do not more carefully
ensure, or advocate for more authority to ensure, that full investigations
84 While beyond the scope of this Essay, improper behavior of a judge that goes unchecked could
put them on what behavioral ethicists call a “slippery slope,” whereby they might begin with relatively
innocuous misconduct that slowly becomes more significant and harmful to those around them. See David
T. Welsh, Lisa D. Ordóñez, Deirdre G. Snyder & Michael S. Christian, The Slippery Slope: How Small
Ethical Transgressions Pave the Way for Larger Future Transgressions, 100 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 114, 124
(2015); MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 93 (2011).
85 Gibson, supra note 82, at 487. Other work discussing legitimacy, although focused on the Supreme
Court, has also been conducted. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Taking Judicial Legitimacy Seriously, 93 CHIKENT L. REV. 505, 506–07 (2018); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged
the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195, 213–16 (2011); James L. Gibson,
Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions: A Question
of Causality, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1991).
86 See Leah M. Litman & Deeva Shah, On Sexual Harassment in the Judiciary, 115 NW. U. L. REV.
599, 617 (2020) (noting that “some federal judges believe that the general rules of the workplace do not,
in fact, apply to them”).
87 James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Least Accountable Branch?, 55 CT. REV. 30, 30 (2019)
(discussing the ways in which the public’s disagreement with a judge’s decision might impact its view of
whether the judiciary is held accountable for its actions).
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occur when allegations of misconduct are presented. In part, this is a result
of the history and realities leading up to the passage of the Act.88 Yet, it may
also be a result of the way judges navigate their interactions with each other
because of concerns regarding civility.
Some may believe that the harm to the judiciary is remedied, in part, by
the judges leaving office. Once a judge has left the bench, some may wonder
whether continuing to pursue an investigation that would serve primarily to
further tarnish the judge’s reputation would be hostile toward norms and
notions of civility within the profession. Part of the answer to this concern
depends on one’s understanding of civility. If notions of civility are focused
merely on “the enforcement of good manners amongst lawyers,” 89 then it
may not seem necessary to continue investigating a judge who has left the
bench. That judge’s poor behavior has now been rectified, albeit without a
full investigation with public resolution. But such a narrow view of civility—
“weak civility”—fails to fully acknowledge the full role of a judge within a
democracy.
Many understand the primary role of a judge to be to decide disputes
between two parties, but the role and function of a judge within a democracy
is arguably much broader.90 While a fulsome exploration is beyond the scope
of this Essay, some view a judge’s role within a democracy as serving to
bridge “the gap between law and society,” which includes “maintain[ing] the
coherence of the legal system as a whole.”91 Additionally, the judge serves
“to protect the constitution and democracy,” which includes “safeguard[ing]
both formal democracy, as expressed in legislative supremacy, and
substantive democracy, as expressed in basic values and human rights.”92
These understandings of the role of the judge, when paired with the
importance of the public finding courts legitimate to ensure compliance93
with judicial orders and pronouncements, suggest that concerns about
civility based on appearances must not take priority over shoring up rule-oflaw norms.
Fidelity to weak civility can be seen throughout the judiciary within the
United States and its reluctance to levy sanctions against its own members.
88 For a more fulsome discussion, see Geyh, supra note 35, at 243–46, and Dana A. Remus, The
Institutional Politics of Federal Judicial Conduct Regulation, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 34–37
(2012).
89 Alice Woolley, Commentary, Does Civility Matter?, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 175, 176 (2008).
90
See Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,
116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 25–26 (2002).
91 Id. at 25.
92 Id. at 26.
93 Gibson, supra note 82, at 487–89.
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A recent study demonstrates the potential depths of the problem. In 2020, a
special report, issued by Reuters, revealed the findings of a large study into
judicial misconduct.94 The upshot of the report is that “[m]ost states afford
judges accused of misconduct a gentle kind of justice,” which demonstrates
widespread reluctance to sanction judges for actions that were found to be
inappropriate. 95 As a result, judges who were failing to follow legal
guidelines in areas like the sentencing of criminal defendants were allowed
to remain on the bench even as they had improperly deprived defendants of
their liberty.96
If the judiciary fails to police itself, and if Congress fails to police the
judiciary, the principles and ideals that form the foundation of the judicial
system within the United States will crumble and fall.97 Civility norms, of
course, matter, but the civility that is most important—“strong civility”—is
focused on “respect and loyalty to clients, respectfulness to the general
public, and ensuring the proper functioning of the legal system.” 98 It
prioritizes the judiciary as an important branch within our government over
the individual inconvenience of the judge. This notion of strong civility is
eroded when judges are allowed to behave badly and, when caught, to save
face and resign without investigation or sanction.
The upshot is, to ensure that rule-of-law norms and the legitimacy of
the courts persist within a democratic system, judges must not be viewed as
above the law. When judges are able to circumvent investigations into their
own conduct, however, it has the potential to erode the public’s view of the
courts as legitimate. For these reasons, it is imperative that mechanisms are
adopted that will ensure investigations into judicial misconduct are
completed, even in the event that the individual is no longer serving as a
judge in the court where the complaint has been filed.

94 Michael Berens & John Shiffman, Special Report: Thousands of U.S. Judges Who Broke Laws,
Oaths Remained on the Bench, REUTERS (June 30, 2020, 7:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-judges-misconduct-specialreport-idUSKBN2411WG [https://perma.cc/NN7C-UY9A].
95 See id.
96 Id.
97 This is not an idea unique to judges. Members of the legal profession, journalists, and a whole host
of other groups must ensure they root out corruption to preserve the democratic ideals this country was
founded on hold. See, e.g., Leah Litman, Lawyers’ Democratic Dysfunction, 68 DRAKE L. REV. 303, 306
(2020) (“When social or professional networks refuse to hold their members accountable for their actions,
the networks lose the ability to function as meaningful safeguards against the breakdown of norms.”).
98 Woolley, supra note 89, at 176.
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B. Simultaneous Referral to Additional Authorities
When a complaint is received, the chief judge may undertake a variety
of actions under the Act, including dismissing the complaint (i) for a lack
of—or plainly untrue—information submitted by the complainant, (ii) for an
inability to investigate, or (iii) if she finds that corrective actions have
already been taken and a formal investigation may no longer seem required.99
Indeed, under the current rules structure, not all allegations will result in “the
formal procedures” or investigations, and the chief circuit judge may
determine “whether informal corrective action will suffice and to initiate
such steps as promptly as is reasonable under the circumstances.” 100 The
chief judge may also dismiss the complaint if there has been an “intervening
event[].”101 These are the options explicitly granted to the chief judge under
the Act, but there is nothing to stop the adoption of additional customs on
how to respond when a complaint regarding the conduct of a judge is
initiated.102
In an effort to ensure that investigations into a judge’s conduct are fully
investigated, each chief judge and each judicial council should adopt a
custom of referral.103 First, they should refer all nonfrivolous complaints to
the state bars of which the judge at issue is a member for investigation and
review to determine if a violation under that state’s rules of professional
conduct occurred. Second, in the event that a retirement or other intervening
cause prevents an investigation into the merits of a complaint against a judge,
the chief judge should automatically refer the case for congressional inquiry
and impeachment.
Customs, while generally not as robust as formal rules, can be quite
powerful tools. Once a custom is entrenched, it can be difficult to walk away
from and, if ignored, it can flag a lack of legitimacy surrounding the action
99

28 U.S.C. § 352(b).
JCDA RULES, supra note 16, at 11.
101 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(2).
102 It is important to remember that the chief judge has a great deal of power within this framework.
Indeed, the chief judge may look to “information from any source, other than a document [filed by or for
a person], that gives a chief judge probable cause to believe that a covered judge . . . has engaged in
misconduct . . . whether or not the information is framed as or is intended to be an allegation of
misconduct” when deciding whether to initiate an investigation. JCDA RULES, supra note 16, at Rule
3(c)(2) (emphasis added).
103 One of the potential limitations, or perhaps flaws, with the Act is the amount of deference that
the individual chief judges hold over what to do with a complaint or allegation of misconduct. The chief
judges are instilled with the authority to act or not act when receiving complaints regarding the behavior
of judges in their circuit, which means chief judges are provided power to handle a variety of potential
concerns regarding judicial conduct and behavior outside a formal process. Geyh, supra note 35, at 248–
49.
100
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undertaken in violation of the established custom. Thus, the judicial councils
and the circuit chief judges should act now to invoke customs that will
bolster the processes and ability of a variety of actors to take a hard look at
the conduct that led to complaints against an Article III judge in an effort to
more fully and completely ensure that complaints against these individuals
are investigated properly.
1. State Bar(s)
The benefit of sending a referral104 to the relevant state bar(s) is that the
scope of authority is actually much broader to regulate the conduct of
lawyers under rules of professional conduct than what the judiciary utilizes
under the Judicial Code of Conduct,105 which sets forth principles and ethical
standards by which judges are to conduct themselves, and the Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act. As a result, it may be easier to obtain a more
thorough review and sanction when the judge’s actions are assessed under
the rules of professional conduct governing lawyers than under the Act.
Take, for example, the allegations of sexual misconduct against Judge
Kozinski. Regardless of what a full on-the-merits adjudication would or
would not have determined under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act,
under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g), Judge Kozinski, if a
member of a state bar that had adopted provisions aligned with the Model
Rules, might be subject to discipline if he, for example, “engage[d] in
conduct that [he] kn[ew] or reasonably should [have] know[n] [wa]s
harassment or discrimination on the basis of . . . sex.”106 If a full investigation
by the state bar determined that Judge Kozinski violated 8.4(g), it could then
levy a range of sanctions against him, including a private or public
reprimand, suspension of Kozinski’s ability to practice for a limited period
of time, or permanent disbarment.107 For Kozinski, this additional possibility
of discipline from the state bar would have real bite because he has chosen
to pursue at least some measure of legal practice. If the bar were to suspend
his license or disbar him altogether, it would send a strong signal to both the

104 One might worry that this sort of intervention may result in the political weaponization of the
state bar disciplinary system. Given the political realities of the day and the unprecedented attacks on
rule-of-law norms, that is a valid concern. That said, a state bar investigation must be rooted in a violation
of some sort of rule of professional conduct, and those systems are accustomed to dismissing unfounded
complaints.
105 2A U.S. CTS., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL POLICY, ch. 2 (2019) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CODE OF
CONDUCT].
106 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
107 MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).

973

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

public and other members of the legal profession that the initial complaint
was taken seriously. In other words, the judge was held to account.
There are, however, innate limitations with this proposal. First, it
requires that the judge is a member of a state bar, because if she is not, there
will be no jurisdiction to evaluate her under the state’s rules of professional
conduct.108 Second, it requires that the judge not resign from the state bar
upon learning of the referral to it, as a resignation from the bar may also
cause a short-circuited investigation into the alleged judicial misconduct.
That said, as evidenced by Judge Kozinski, a judge might agree to retire from
being a member of the judiciary and still expect to be able to fall back on
practicing law as an attorney. This can exacerbate the harms caused by lack
of judicial sanction. If judges are able to sidestep inquiries into their conduct,
yet are still able to practice law in the same community, their continued
presence in legal proceedings and settings will further undermine the
community’s faith in and acceptance of the ability of the judiciary and the
legal profession to ensure that their own members are adhering to rule of law
principles.
Third, state bars often have very limited resources to expend on
investigations. 109 They may question whether it is an efficient use of
resources to levy an investigation into conduct that occurred while an
individual was a judge when they have since left office. Fourth, state bars
have a whole host of disciplinary options at their disposal, including the
option of a private reprimand. As such, a state bar might decide to initiate an
investigation, but determine that a public disclosure of the need to impose
discipline is not needed. In these instances, the public will remain in the dark
regarding the results of any investigation into the alleged misconduct.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if the state bar is captured110 by the

108 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer admitted to
practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where
the lawyer’s conduct occurs.”).
109 See, e.g., Veronica Root Martinez, Combating Silence in the Profession, 105 VA. L. REV. 805,
845 (2019) (“When members of the profession suggest that the ABA or state bar[s] . . . take on a new
task or oversight responsibility, a ‘resources’ objection is quickly made.”); Lisa H. Nicholson, Access to
Justice Requires Access to Attorneys: Restrictions on the Practice of Law Serve a Societal Purpose,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761, 2789 (2014) (noting budget constraints of many state bar committees);
Beverly Storm, Mandatory Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct: Can the Bench & Bar of the Commonwealth
Discipline Itself Without It?, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 809, 814 (1993) (noting that the lawyer discipline system
is “over-taxed with complaints of fraud, conversion and substance abuse”).
110 “Capture refers to an extremely close relationship between regulator[] and [the regulated],” in
this case, the reality that members of the legal profession who make decisions within the state bar might
have close relationships with members of the judiciary in that state. Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client”
Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523, 579 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dorit
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judiciary and its members, it may not be willing to initiate, or oversee, an
investigation into a judge or former judge.111
As for these latter three concerns, members of the legal profession are
members of a self-regulated profession, and state bars are accustomed to
investigating and levying sanctions against their own. That is not to suggest
that it would be easy or trivial for a state bar to enter into an investigation
into an Article III judge—it would be significant—but it is not an
unprecedented role for leaders within the profession to undertake given the
realities of regulation for members of the legal profession more generally.
State bars are familiar with the need to prioritize the utilization of finite
resources, and it is appropriate for them to use their best judgment regarding
how to respond to cases referred to them by chief judges, just as it is
appropriate to defer to them regarding whether results of any discipline
should be made public or remain private. Importantly, state bars have chosen
to sanction politicians and other powerful individuals in the past whose
misconduct was well known and high-profile. For example, President Bill
Clinton served a five-year suspension of his Arkansas law license in
connection to false statements he made during the course of the Monica
Lewinsky investigation.112 Referring concerns regarding improper behavior
of a judge to a state bar does not require the state bar to take a particular
course of action, but it does prompt the state bar to consider whether action
is appropriate given the allegations contained in the referral.
2. Congressional Impeachment
In the event that a retirement or other intervening cause prevents an
investigation into the merits of a complaint against a judge, a chief judge
should automatically refer the case for congressional inquiry and
impeachment with an explicit request for a response regarding the status of
the congressional inquiry to ensure a review does in fact occur.113
Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569, 570 (2012) (discussing the
phenomenon of monitor capture)).
111 While concerns about capture of local state bar members are certainly important, capture may be
of even greater concern when a judicial council is making a determination about how to sanction one of
its own—and this is true even when transferred to a different circuit’s judicial council. See, e.g., Geyh,
supra note 35, at 244 (noting that some have argued that “judges cannot be trusted to judge judges”).
112 Associated Press, Bill Clinton Can Re-Apply for His Lawyer License, NBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2006,
8:28 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/10904831/ns/politics/t/bill-clinton-can-re-apply-his-lawyerlicense/#.XyzUjShKhPY [https://perma.cc/XF4L-6JAP]; Robert L. Jackson, Ethics Panel Advises
Clinton Be Disbarred, L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2000, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/laxpm-2000-may-23-mn-33092-story.html [https://perma.cc/A5MS-MJ8V].
113 Requesting a response may invoke separation-of-powers concerns. The goal here, however, is to
encourage Congress to actually look at the matter, and asking for a response is meant to nudge them to
do so. It is not meant to encourage them to make a particular decision or to take particular actions.
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Referrals to Congress already occur on an ad hoc basis. For example,
after Judge Kozinski resigned in 2018, the Second Circuit Judicial Council
requested its opinion be forwarded to appropriate congressional committees,
but this was based, in part, on the gravity of the accusations. 114 In other
words, the referral did not occur solely because Judge Kozinski’s retirement
eliminated the Judicial Council’s jurisdiction to investigate; rather, it was
referred because the investigation was circumvented and the allegations
seemed serious. That makes intuitive sense, but a rule based on the perceived
gravity of the offense would likely miss cases like those of Judge Barry,
whose alleged misconduct had run well past any applicable statutes of
limitations.115
The upshot is that the potential harm to the judiciary and rule-of-law
norms from unadjudicated judicial complaints appear significant enough to
warrant the adoption of customs by the judicial circuits that would require
congressional oversight and inquiry into investigations that are stalled by
intervening causes, like retirement. Again, if the arbiters of justice—
judges—are perceived as being above the law, it has the potential to decrease
the sense of legitimacy and fundamental fairness necessary for the populace
to maintain high levels of trust in the judiciary.
Importantly, there are at least two potential benefits to a custom of
automatic referrals. First, if a custom to automatically refer the matter to
Congress becomes strong, then it might disincentivize judges from retiring
from the court in an effort to thwart further investigation. Thus, it may
decrease the need for congressional inquiry. And again, a custom of this
nature can be implemented immediately by the chief judges of the various
judicial councils.
Second, it may serve to normalize congressional oversight of instances
of judicial misconduct. To date, relatively few impeachment proceedings
have been pursued by Congress involving Article III judges. To the extent
that there is not much misconduct within the federal judiciary, a low number
of impeachment proceedings would likely be perceived as good. Yet, when
a judge leaves the bench in response to an allegation that looks to contain a
credible complaint, a lack of congressional response may send negative
signals to the public.116 It might signal apathy regarding potential corruption
114

Kozinski Order, supra note 16, at 4.
Judge Barry’s case was not referred for review by appropriate congressional committees. Barry
Order, supra note 15, at 2.
116 Impeachment may help assuage the concerns of the public regarding potential judicial misconduct
more than if the judiciary is policing itself, given the different interests of each group. See, e.g., Paula
Abrams, Spare the Rod and Spoil the Judge? Discipline of Federal Judges and the Separation of Powers,
115
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within the judiciary. It might also signal an unwillingness to sanction
individuals who are perceived as having power, which could further entrench
perceptions that judges are above the law. But if Congress is referred cases
where the judge attempts to short-circuit the investigative process, it will
provide an opportunity for Congress to restore norms of legitimacy
surrounding the judiciary.
In reality, there are not likely to be very many of these investigations
by referral, as these sorts of cases appear to be relatively rare when
considering their frequency against the number of active Article III judges
within the United States. Yet a decision to allow well-founded complaints of
public concern regarding judicial misconduct to go uninvestigated has the
potential to harm the rule of law and the democratic ideals upon which the
United States is founded. It is Congress’s constitutional duty to intervene.
There are, however, some legitimate objections to increased
congressional oversight into complaints filed alleging judicial misconduct.
First, impeachment involves significant costs in terms of both time and
monetary resources. 117 Second, because the House and Senate are given
separate powers regarding impeachment, the process of impeaching an
Article III judge may be inefficient and may devolve into political theater
that fails to achieve a concrete and respected resolution. Third, and perhaps
most importantly, Congress may be concerned that if it takes too active a role
in policing the activities of members of the judiciary, it might be perceived
as encroaching on the separation of powers between the three branches of
government.118
These concerns, however, demonstrate the need for another proposal to
realize this Essay’s thesis, which is that it is imperative that mechanisms are
adopted that will ensure investigations into judicial misconduct are
completed, even in the event that the individual is no longer serving as a
judge in the court where the complaint has been filed.

41 DEPAUL L. REV. 59, 60 (1991) (discussing the competing interests of the judiciary taking actions in
ensuring fair judicial processes versus the interest of Congress in assuring public accountability by
impeaching public officers for serious abuses and misconduct).
117 One impeachment inquiry lasted over two years. The Impeachment Trial of Alcee L. Hastings
(1989) U.S. District Judge, Florida, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
common/briefing/Impeachment_Hastings.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6HP-ZJ58]. The estimated cost of the
impeachment inquiry was over $2 million. 135 CONG. REC. 5458 (1989) (statement of Terence J.
Anderson, counsel to U.S. District Court Judge Alcee L. Hastings).
118 For a bit more history of the interplay between the judiciary and Congress regarding regulation
of judicial conduct, see Remus, supra note 88, at 34–38.
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C. Amend the Act
In 1980, Congress passed the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act,
which empowered judges to, like the legal profession 119 and Congress 120
itself, police themselves and each other.121 In doing so, Congress acted upon
its own oversight authority to ensure that Article III judges were not violating
the requirement to adhere to good behavior122 while serving as a judge, but
did so in a way that allowed the Legislative Branch a certain hands-off
approach, by deferring much of the oversight work to the judges themselves
under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act. Given how the Act has
functioned over the past several years, and the awareness that jurisdictional
limitations exist that allow judges to avoid a full investigation on the merits
of their complaints by resigning, it seems time for the Act to be amended.
Reforming the Act is an ongoing debate among legal scholars123 and
policymakers.124 This Essay supports that debate, as well as concrete actions
to expand and strengthen judicial councils’ authority to act. By broadening
the scope of authority of judicial councils to permit investigations even in
the event of the judge’s retirement (or elevation) and addressing the impact
of a judicial investigation into a judge’s qualifications for their federal
pension, Congress could improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of
investigations brought under the Act. That said, it seems unlikely that much
will be done on that front in the near term; thus, this Essay focuses its efforts
on encouraging the creation and implementation of customs that might help
to incentivize more robust investigations of complaints into alleged judicial
misconduct.
This Essay makes two proposals. One focuses on creating a custom of
referral to state bars and Congress. The other requires Congress to adopt
significant revisions to the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act. While the
119

See Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649, 657–58

(2016).
120 About, HOUSE COMM. ON ETHICS, https://ethics.house.gov/about [https://perma.cc/8L9G-4A65];
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, THE SENATE CODE OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT 57 (2015).
121 See generally Tracey L. Adams, Self-Regulating Professions: Past, Present, Future, 4 J. PROS. &
ORG. 70 (2017) (discussing international use of self-regulation).
122 I use “good behavior” here not in the conventional sense, but in the sense described by Professors
Prakash and Smith. Prakash & Smith, supra note 4, at 88–105.
123 See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, An Unfinished Dialogue: Congress, the Judiciary, and the Rules
for Federal Judicial Misconduct Proceedings, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 346 (2019); Jeffrey N. Barr
& Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, and Judicial Independence Under
the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 29, 180–95 (1993).
124 See, e.g., Robert H. Tembeckjian, Toward a Judiciary Both Independent and Accountable, 55 CT.
REV. 62, 66 (2019); Press Release, supra note 83; Budryk, supra note 83; THE JUD. CONDUCT &
DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF
1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE (2006).
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second proposal would be more difficult to enact, it is likely the superior
form of intervention.
III. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
This Essay contributes to conversations about the complex task of how
to best design a system of oversight for Article III judges. It argues that it is
imperative that mechanisms are adopted that will ensure investigations into
judicial misconduct are completed, even in the event that the individual is no
longer serving as a judge in the circuit where the complaint has been filed.
However, this argument raises several additional considerations.
This Part addresses three such concerns: (i) the impact of unsanctioned
misconduct on the judiciary’s members, (ii) what to do regarding the pension
of a judge who has retired to avoid investigations of misconduct, and
(iii) how best to address the expectations and conduct of Supreme Court
Justices. But there are many others that should be considered and addressed
in future work by both scholars and policymakers.
A. Impact on Members of the Judiciary
In addition to potential harms to the public’s belief in and adherence to
rule-of-law norms, unchecked misconduct within the judiciary may also
impact the judges themselves in a myriad of undesirable ways. In particular,
it may make the misconduct become more entrenched.
Within behavioral ethics literature, there is a concept known as
“slippery slope,” whereby when people engage in “small indiscretions over
time,” it “may gradually lead people to commit larger unethical acts that they
otherwise would have judged to be impermissible.”125 Research suggests that
“past behavior serves as a guide for future ethical choices,” so that “gradual
changes across a series of ethical decisions, as opposed to abrupt changes,
may facilitate moral disengagement through an induction mechanism in
which unethical conduct becomes routinized over time and is deemed
acceptable” without the person ever fully thinking through why they have
determined the behavior is acceptable.126
The chambers of an Article III judge is, in many ways, her own little
kingdom. As discussed above, there is very little oversight into the judge’s
conduct. And as recent scandals sparked by a #MeToo movement within the
judiciary have revealed, the avenues for reporting judicial misconduct have
traditionally been, at best, limited, although actions to address these
125
126

Welsh et al., supra note 84, at 114.
Id. at 116.
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limitations are ongoing. 127 For individual judges, the lack of reporting
structures may have created situations where behavior that could have been
complained about and rectified when it first appeared instead was either (i)
not identified, or (ii) tolerated in a manner that resulted in an increase in the
improper behavior. Each little step—whether an inappropriate joke or
seemingly eccentric behavior—left unchecked128 is an opportunity to slide
further and further down a slippery slope, which can have devastating results
for those residing in that judge’s kingdom.
Additionally, the slippery slope effect can impact others within an
organization—in this case other members of the court and the legal
community. Research demonstrates “that people also commonly fail to
notice the slippery slope of others’ unethical behavior,” which can cause
them to ignore “clear warning signals” that something is amiss. 129 In
particular, behavioral ethics research has “found that people are less likely
to perceive changes in others’ unethical behavior if the changes occur slowly
over time rather than abruptly.”130 Applying this to the members of the court
and legal community, there might be some level of awareness of improper
conduct by a judge, but if it starts off small and grows more significant over
time, it is less likely to be perceived or recognized as problematic, and is
more likely to just be understood as how that judge operates. In other words,
that conduct might become normalized and accepted.
Without strong mechanisms for signaling intolerance for judicial
misconduct, the judiciary makes itself vulnerable to a whole host of potential
risks. Members of the judiciary, Congress, and the public should continue to
consider what strategies might be adopted to ensure that the judges appointed
to fulfill crucial functions within the United States’ democracy actually
remain above reproach and, if and when they stumble, are held to account.
While there are several reforms currently under consideration and in
implementation stages regarding particular areas of concern,131 this Essay
focuses on investigations into allegations of judicial misconduct and argues
in favor of finding mechanisms for allowing investigations to continue even
in the event that the judge in question leaves the court.

127 Litman & Shah, supra note 86, at 615–20; U.S. CTS., STATUS REPORT FROM THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY WORKPLACE CONDUCT WORKING GROUP TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 8–11 (2019).
128
Importantly, behavioral ethics research suggests that there are prevention mechanisms that can
help curb the slippery-slope-effect. Welsh et al., supra note 84, at 125.
129 BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 84, at 92 (emphasis added).
130 Id. at 93.
131 See U.S. CTS., supra note 127 (summarizing the progress on various proposals).
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B. Lifetime Pension
One of the more troubling concerns associated with a judge’s decision
to leave the bench prior to an investigation into alleged misconduct is that it
often ensures that the judge will be able to collect his or her pension—which
is essentially his or her salary—for life. For example, when Judge Barry
retired in response to the complaint being filed against her with the Judicial
Council, she continued to collect her pension, which is estimated to be
between $184,500 to $217,600 a year.132
To qualify for a retirement pension, an Article III judge must satisfy the
“Rule of 80,”133 which is a combination of the listed years-of-service and age
requirements to receive a pension equal to the salary earned just prior to
leaving office.134
Attained Age
65
66
67
68
69
70

Length of Service Required
for Pension
15
14
13
12
11
10

Today, no provision under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act or other
federal statute prohibits a judge from receiving his pension if he is subject to
an investigation by the circuit’s judicial council regarding allegations of
misconduct.135
132 Buettner & Craig, supra note 54; Debra Cassens Weiss, Trump’s Sister, a Federal Appeals Judge,
Resigns amid Ethics Inquiry, ABA J. (Apr. 11, 2019, 9:15 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/trumps-sister-a-federal-appeals-judge-resigns-amid-ethics-inquiry
[https://perma.cc/CM4NU8PY].
133 Under the “Rule of 80,” a judge whose age and years of experience on the bench equal eighty is
entitled to receive a full pension equal to his or her salary. 28 U.S.C. § 371(a)–(c). See Marin K. Levy,
The Promise of Senior Judges, 115 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), for further discussion of the Rule
of 80.
134 28 U.S.C. § 371(c).
135 Unlike Article III judges, who can receive their pensions regardless of a criminal conviction,
members of Congress found guilty of espionage, treason, or several other national security offenses
against the United States must forfeit their federal retirement pension. 5 U.S.C. § 8312. Indeed, Judge
Kent actually requested that he be able to retire in a manner that would enable him to keep drawing his
salary after being found guilty of making false statements during the judicial council inquiry into his
conduct. McKinley, supra note 12.
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Under current law, a court today would likely find that a judicial
pension is a protected right under the Constitution through one of the
following arguments: one based on contract law or one based on Article III’s
Compensation Clause.
Applying the contract rationale, a U.S. Court of Federal Claims case,
Johnson v. United States, found that a federal statute regarding judicial
pensions created a contractual agreement between the retiring judge and the
government when the judge met the statute’s requirements to receive
lifetime pension payments equal to his salary upon leaving office. 136 The
majority reasoned that a judge, upon satisfying the statute’s specific
retirement terms, abdicates his office in consideration of the lifetime pension
payments.137 As one congressman noted at the time the statute was passed,
judicial pensions were “not so much for the purpose of paying them for the
service they have rendered as judges[, but rather so] . . . that [Congress]
m[ight] have a mode of inducing them to leave the bench when they become
too old to perform good service upon it.”138
Accordingly, under Johnson, if Congress chooses not to impeach a
federal judge but still attempts to prevent him from receiving his lifetime
pension, a court may find the government in breach of the contract and force
the government to pay the pension that was in effect at the time the judge
took office. However, Johnson also explained that if a judge voluntarily
renounces a federal pension provided for by law in exchange for Congress
not initiating impeachment proceedings, then the judge would no longer be
entitled to that compensation. The court justified this loss of entitlement by
stating that Congress would not be forced to pay the judge his pension due
to the theory of promissory estoppel “and good conscience.”139
A judge’s right to a judicial pension, even if she retires to avoid
misconduct investigations, can also be justified by using Article III’s
Compensation Clause. Under this analysis, a court may find that because
Congress has already provided judges currently holding office an expected
pension compensation under 28 U.S.C. § 371, Congress cannot diminish or
prevent a judge from collecting this pension. The court in Beer v. United
States used this reasoning to reject Congress’s effort to modify cost-of-living

136

79 F. Supp. 208, 211 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
Consideration requires that the promisor “manifest an intent to induce the performance or return
promise.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981). But see id. § 81
(noting that even if “what is bargained for does not of itself induce the making of a promise,” that “does
not prevent it from being consideration for the promise”).
138 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 647 (1869).
139 Johnson, 79 F. Supp. at 213.
137
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increases for judges. The majority found that “all sitting federal judges are
entitled to expect that their real salary will not diminish due to . . . the action
or inaction of the other branches of Government.”140 The Court also noted
that “when Congress promise[s] protection against diminishment in real pay
in a definite manner . . . that Act trigger[s] the expectation-related
protections of the Compensation Clause for all sitting judges. A later
Congress c[annot] renege on that commitment without diminishing judicial
compensation.” 141 Similarly, in United States v. Will, the Supreme Court
found that Congress could not eliminate cost-of-living adjustments for
judges when such adjustments were provided for in a statute that had already
taken effect.142
If a court were to apply the reasoning used in Beer and Will to judicial
pensions, it may find that these pensions are likely covered under Article
III’s Compensation Clause. Given that a judge, under 28 U.S.C. § 371, can
receive an annual pension after satisfying the “Rule of 80” requirement, a
court may find that such pensions are a guaranteed component of judicial
salaries for all judges currently on the bench.
But, in theory, because Congress would not be reducing any current
Article III judge’s salary but rather placing new conditions for new judges to
receive a pension, a court may find that this sort of targeted legislation would
not violate the Compensation Clause.143
C. The Supreme Court
This Essay is focused on ensuring that investigations into complaints
filed against Article III judges are not circumvented by the jurisdictional
limitations within the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, but the Act has
yet another relatively big omission. It does not apply to one class of Article
III judges: Supreme Court Justices.144 A perhaps obvious question raised by
the arguments in this Essay regarding the need to investigate claims of
judicial misconduct so as not to diminish rule-of-law norms is whether
Supreme Court Justices should be exempt from the Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act.
140

Beer v. United States, 696 F.3d 1174, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1184–85.
142 449 U.S. 200, 224–26 (1980).
143 Congress is, of course, free to pass legislation that changes judicial salary as long as the new
conditions apply to newly appointed Article III judges while grandfathering previously appointed judges
in to the prior compensation system. Further discussion of the modifications to judicial compensation is
beyond the scope of this Essay.
144 Judges covered under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act include circuit judges, district
judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges. 28 U.S.C. § 351(d)(1).
141
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The lack of oversight of the Justices, paired with their nonexistent ethics
rules,145 has been the subject of a long-standing public debate.146 How to best
incorporate oversight of Supreme Court Justices is generally beyond the
scope of this Essay. It is, however, worth acknowledging two points. First,
the separation-of-powers concerns, discussed above, about the interplay
between congressional oversight of judges and the importance of an
independent judiciary are likely exacerbated when considering Supreme
Court Justices, as they are the utmost authority of one of the three branches
of the United States government. 147 Second, if we want to defer to an
organization’s ability to self-police, which is what the Supreme Court
currently does, it seems reasonable to expect the organization to adopt a set
of clear and impartial expectations for itself. Without an ex ante set of
expectations and standards, the legitimacy of decisions made by the Justices
when there is an appearance of impropriety will always remain suspect.148
CONCLUSION
The importance of the courts to ensuring faith in and compliance with
democratic norms and ideals within the United States cannot be overstated.
Since the time of America’s birth, a strong judiciary has been recognized as
imperative for the success of its democracy. Yet, when judges are perceived
as functioning above the law—as impervious to discipline—it may
delegitimize the courts within the view of the public. This Essay contributes
to conversations regarding the need to ensure that the judiciary remains
perceived as a legitimate source of authority within American society. In
particular, it argues in favor of taking concrete steps that will ensure
145

The Judicial Code of Conduct also does not apply to Supreme Court Justices. JUDICIAL CODE OF
CONDUCT, supra note 105, at 2. Justice Samuel Alito has noted that the Supreme Court “follow[s] the
[judicial] code of conduct that applies to the lower courts, but [the Court does not] regard [itself] as being
legally bound by it.” Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for 2020: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th Cong. 96
(2019) (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court). He also stated that he
believes “it is inconsistent with the constitutional structure for lower court judges to be reviewing things
done by Supreme Court Justices for compliance with ethical rules.” Id.
146 Compare JOHANNA KALB & ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., SUPREME COURT
ETHICS REFORM: THE NEED FOR AN ETHICS CODE AND ADDITIONAL TRANSPARENCY 2, 4–5 (2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/supreme-court-ethics-reform
[https://perma.cc/QZ4C-Z7K6] (noting “long-standing debate” over why the Supreme Court is not bound
by an ethical code and suggesting reforms), with JOHN J. ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4–7 (2011) (explaining that Supreme Court Justices “do in fact consult the Code of
Conduct in assessing their ethical obligations” and detailing other ways that Justices “seek[] to follow
high ethical standards”).
147 See KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10255, A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE SUPREME
COURT? LEGAL QUESTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 2–3 (2019).
148 See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 662 (2005).
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investigations into judicial misconduct are completed, even in the event that
the individual is no longer serving as a judge in the circuit where the
complaint has been filed.
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